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Abstract. This paper is motivated by Heidegger’s invitation to think the essence of technics 
through a dialogue between technics and art. This dialogue is approached with the help of 
several artworks belonging to what can be called the “technological turn” in art. First, I draw 
a schematic picture of notions of instrumentality, rationality, totality, and teleology inherited 
from classical philosophy of art and technology and challenged by contemporary art. I 
underline the Romantic claim that art overcomes these features thanks to its freedom and ask, 
referring to the work of Gilbert Simondon, whether technology could also be liberated from 
its subordination to utilitarian ends. Second, I look at how certain contemporary works of art 
attempt to solve some of these problems. Artists who seize technical objects generally seek to 
make their functioning visible and problematic by distorting, interrupting, or otherwise 
modifying the technical dispositif: this is when a machine becomes a work of art. I show how 
this happens in certain works of Rebecca Horn, Jean Tinguely, Anaïs Tondeur, Eduardo Kac, 
and Tomas Saraceno. In conclusion, I will show how art can liberate technology by liberating 
it from utility and instrumentality and by exposing it as such in its functioning. On the other 
hand, I argue that technology can liberate art, both through artistic techniques and nonartistic 
technological processes.  
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The Rivalry between Art and Technics 
In what follows, in the wake of Heidegger’s “The Origin of the Work of Art,” I will approach 
art in the very general framework of the question concerning the essence of art. Readers of 
this text know that Heidegger elucidates the function of art as the “setting-into-work of truth”: 
“that which is at work in the work [of art is] truth.”1 Accordingly, I will approach technics in 
the sense of the Heideggerian Technik, which does not mean simply particular instrumental 
and industrial practices, but points beyond them toward the essence of technics that, according 
to “The Question Concerning Technology,” “is by no means anything technological,” as 
“technology is a way of revealing . . .  i.e., of truth.” Modern technics reveals truth in a 
particular way in function of Ge-stell, approximatively translated as enframing.2 Although the 
English translator of “The Question Concerning Technology” renders Technik by technology, 
this translation appears too restrictive to me, and this is why I will also use the words technics 
and technique (the latter being also the choice of the French translators of Heidegger). Instead 
of sharply distinguishing between technology, technique, and technics, as the English 
language invites to do, I look for their common essence in which these differences fade. On 
this level of abstraction, what, then, is the relationship between art and technics? 
Art has always been haunted by technics.3 It is obsessed by technics because it wants its 
ingenious instruments and reliable rules. At the same time, art fears instrumentality, 
regularity, and calculability, and does its best to conceal its own techniques and technologies. 
Technics is the repressed unconscious of art. 
Technics, including modern technology, has, in turn, always been haunted by art. It is 
obsessed by art because it desires art’s capacity for invention, discovery, and creation. At the 
same time it refuses to give priority to vision over knowledge, to intuition over calculation, or 
to phantastic chimaeras over solid, reliable structures. Technics exorcises the lighthearted 
irresponsibility of art, of which it is at the same time jealous. 
The least one can say is that—ever since the first theories of technē—the relation 
between art and technics has been as ambiguous as it has been passionate. One is not the 
cause, the reason, the application, or the image of the other. They are similar without being 
the same, interlocked in a mimetic rivalry that cannot be satisfied by a conciliatory solution 
but rather only by an exacerbation of the combat.4  
The difference between art and technics is the imperceptible, unthinkable difference 
between fantasy and rule, novelty and repetition, surprise and necessity that is one of the big 
metaphysical questions of our time. Elsewhere, I have analyzed this difference in terms of 
transcendence, understood not as the realization of ideas but as the transformation and the 
generation of forms themselves.5 I will not go into this question here; I simply mention it as 
the ultimate horizon of the problems confronted here, as I believe that the crucial question of 
the generativity of the transcendence is nowhere treated as profoundly as in the contemporary 
debate between art and technics that I will elucidate.  
In what follows, I will try to see whether the ancient rivalry between art and technique 
has overcome old deadlocks and discovered new forms in the current trend of contemporary 
art since the 1980s that Ludovic Duhem has fittingly called the “technological turn in art,” 
characterized by an explicit artistic thematization of contemporary industrial technologies.6 Of 
course, art has always been “technical” in the sense that it has its own techniques and tools, 
and sometimes it reflects upon them in its works. The term “technological turn in art” refers to 
a specific type of contemporary artwork that not only displays technology but also uses as its 
medium contemporary industrial technologies not primarily designed for artistic use, such as 
industrial robots removed from their tasks and left to dance alone in a museum. Even though I 
start from very general philosophical problems, my aim is not to make general claims 
concerning what art in general, or contemporary art in particular, is or should be, but simply 
to see how the problems I am interested in have been confronted in several works that can be 
analyzed in terms of—for lack of anything better, but why not?—a “technological turn in art.” 
The rivalry between art and technics is ancient. I will first draw a schematic picture of 
some key conceptual dilemmas, inherited from classical philosophy of art and technics, and 
show how Heidegger makes them accessible to contemporary art. I will then look at how 
certain contemporary works of art attempt to solve some of these dilemmas. I do not pretend 
to give an exhaustive explication of recent trends in techno-art; I will simply evoke several 
works that fruitfully illustrate the relation between art and technics. Finally, I will propose a 
way of thinking about art as the liberation of technics and about technics as the liberation of 
art. 
The historical background of the problem is generally well known. While for the ancient 
Greeks technē meant both art and technique, Kant and German Romanticism distinguished 
between the two. Schelling, in particular, regarded art as the presentation par excellence of 
philosophical truth: if truth was to be present, it could only be so in an artistic presentation.7 
Technics, on the contrary, was most often depreciated as a servile tool of economic activities. 
From Kant and Hegel up to Heidegger, when philosophers mention technics at all, it is mainly 
to reject it soon after, and artistic technique (instruments, rules of composition) is given a 
secondary role. 
The relation between art and technics did not really become a focal point of 
philosophical investigation before Heidegger, although he initially follows the Romantic 
tradition in giving art a central role as the setting-to-work of truth: art installs the place in 
which truth can freely happen. However, beginning with “The Origin of the Work of Art,” 
Heidegger draws attention to the fact that the work of art is also a thing, an installation 
(thesis) in which truth can appear, and thus also something technically produced and 
fabricated.8 It is a work, but in order to be a work of art, its work-character must nonetheless 
be obliterated before its character of truth. As such, modern technics serves a science that 
“does not think,”9 and in this sense, even technics is “stupid.” Here, art is associated with 
truth, while technics leads to “erring” (Irrnis).10 
In a scant remark at the end of “The Question Concerning Technology,” Heidegger also 
notes that if we are able to question the essence of technics, instead of merely using it blindly, 
we are liberated to questioning the truth of our epoch: “For man becomes truly free only 
insofar as he belongs to the realm of destining and so becomes one who listens, though not 
only one who simply obeys. The essence of freedom is originally not connected with the will 
or even with the causality of human willing. Freedom governs the free space in the sense of 
the cleared, that is to say, revealed.”11 For Heidegger, freedom is always tied to the 
clarification of the essence of the epoch, here, of the epoch of technology. We cannot attain an 
understanding of our own being without facing the truth of the epoch of untruth (calculation, 
planning, resource, and totalization). But the revelation of the truth of the epoch of technology 
can only take place in art—on the condition that art stops scorning technology and looks for 
its essence instead. This is the sense of the enigmatic lines at very end of the essay: 
 
Because the essence of technology is nothing technological, essential reflection upon 
technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, on the one 
hand, akin to the essence of technology and, on the other, fundamentally different from 
it. Such a realm is art. But certainly only if reflection upon art, for its part, does not shut 
its eyes to the constellation of truth, concerning which we are questioning. Thus 
questioning, we bear witness to the crisis that in our sheer preoccupation with 
technology we do not yet experience the essential unfolding of technology, that in our 
sheer aesthetic-mindedness we no longer guard and preserve the essential unfolding of 
art. Yet the more questioningly we ponder the essence of technology, the more 
mysterious the essence of art becomes.12 
 
This is how the possibility of freedom in the epoch of technology depends of art’s 
capacity of questioning its essence. Such questioning will also affect art’s reflection on its 
own essence, especially because it shares the same origin as technique—technē. My aim in 
this article is to see how certain works of contemporary art can be analyzed as contributions to 
this project: they exercise a free relation to technics in order to make it possible to question 
the technics of our time more fundamentally. Since Heidegger says that a free relation to 
technics relates to the ambiguous essence of technics, but does not say much more about 
technics itself, I will also turn to the work of Gilbert Simondon, asking whether a free relation 
to technics could also reveal a free technique that is capable of some truth. 
Heidegger points to the need for a free relation to technics that delivers technique from 
servility and liberates it for truth. He also claims that such a liberation calls for a dialogue 
between technics and art. According to him, the meditation on technique and art requires their 
mutual confrontation (Auseinandersetzung). Only a confrontation that does not reduce the two 
parties to a common ground, but rather reveals each party in the irreducibility of its proper 
essence, will allow us to question technics and encounter the secret of art.  
Heidegger does not further elaborate on this confrontation. However, it is easy to see 
that art’s dialogue with technics has been going on intensively for quite a while—in literature 
since the nineteenth century, in the visual arts since the beginning of the twentieth, and in 
philosophy since the mid-twentieth. Moreover, contemporary art historians refer to a 
“technological turn in art” since the 1980s. Let us take a look at the main philosophical 
concepts mobilized in the dialogue. 
1) Instrumentality. The historical starting point of the dialogue between art and technics 
has been the concept of instrumentality. Both art and technics are seen as instruments, but in a 
different sense. Technics has always been understood primarily as a means subordinated to 
human aims in terms of its utility. Art was distinguished from technics as a means without 
utilitarian aims. Kant analyzed art’s Zweckmässigkeit ohne Zweck and emphasized that beauty 
pleases ohne Interesse.13 
The liberation of art from instrumentality brings it close to nature; in turn, nature's 
proximity with art contributes to the emergence of a new conception of nature. As Kant 
noticed and as Schelling realized more clearly, both art and nature are Zweckmässigkeit ohne 
Zweck. This does not mean that art imitates nature, but that they are connected by a deeper 
identity: both manifest the same free finality and original creativity. For Schelling, this 
original creativity is the modality of being itself, the fundamental metaphysical force that 
philosophy seeks to comprehend. It must be understood as belonging to both spirit and nature, 
being visible especially in art and animality, so that the “true touching stone of philosophy is 
tierische Kunsttrieb” in which nature makes art and art is contained in nature.14 While 
Schelling’s remark may appear marginal, it will turn out to be useful for us later. It is radical 
in being opposed to the dominant Cartesian tradition that understood the animal as a dull 
machine and all of nature as a huge mechanism—that is, in Schelling’s terms, as dead things. 
Understanding animality and nature in terms of art amounts to thinking them in terms of 
creation and life. Here we see that the dialogue between art and technics mobilizes the 
metaphysical question concerning nature. If nature is technical, it is bound to unchanging 
mechanical rules, but if it is like art, it is capable of genuine creativity. 
2) Rationality. A second major movement of the dialogue between art and technics 
examines their inherent rationality. It is an inversion of the idea of instrumentality: instead of 
depicting art and technics as human instruments, it interprets the human being as the 
instrument of a spiritual or technological system. If, according to Schelling or Hegel, art and 
religion are capable of presenting logos in history, philosophers like Marx, Heidegger, Ellul, 
and the Frankfurt School think, by contrast, that the technical system also presents its logos in 
history—even though it is a false logos, not the absolute spirit but its demonic double. This is 
characteristic of the recent era of industrial capitalism, in which the entire world functions as 
a technical system in which we are just small components.  
These theories affirm that both art and technics have their own aims that are superior to 
human intentions. Either the aims are superior to human knowledge, as they are for Schelling 
and, to a lesser extent, for Hegel, who thought that (great) art does not express human desires 
but the absolute logos itself—or, alternatively, these aims cover both human and absolute 
truth, as in the thesis of the technical epoch in which the human being does not so much make 
use of industrial capitalism but is rather utilized by it. Art and technics are not instruments at 
our disposal but have their own rationality, their own ways of representing reality as a 
systematic totality.  The system uses us, sometimes putting us in the service of absolute 
truth—the role of art, religion, and philosophy according to Schelling and Hegel—and 
sometimes in the unholy service of the spirit of modern technology—the consequence of the 
Ge-stell of modern technics in Heidegger. (Lacoue-Labarthe would probably have said that 
Wagner’s opera synthetizes both tendencies in a total techno-artistic work.15) 
3) Proliferating multiplicities. Today, the very idea of a (systematic) totality is contested 
in the name of change and multiplicity. The theses of the revelation of absolute spirit in art 
and of the totalitarian spirit of technology hold a common presupposition that is no longer 
tenable, namely, that there is one (true or unholy) logos that manifests itself in absolute art or 
technique. This idea has now been challenged many times, for instance by Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari in Anti-Oedipus, or by Jacques Derrida in his early work, for instance, Of 
Grammatology. Derrida constructs his famous theory of writing partly as an answer to 
Heidegger. Against Heidegger, who keeps logos (and word) apart from technics, Derrida on 
the contrary shows the dependency of all logos on writing. According to Derrida, “writing” is 
irreducible: all systems of logos rely on different “techniques” of writing that inevitably have 
unintended and unreasonable effects on logos. Contrary to Heidegger’s thesis, these effects do 
not incarnate a superior order, nor do they form a whole. Technics functions as writing and 
not as a total system, and there can be no absolute logos either, since the latter depends on the 
former. There are just discourses, as well as artistic and technological works and contexts, 
proliferating like vegetation without a general overall plan. 
4) Functioning. It seems to me that today the dialogue between art and technics is no 
more about bringing them back to a common ground (such as technē, instrumentality, or 
rationality), but rather about making each party more visible in its singularity by confronting 
the other in its alterity and strangeness. The question is not what exterior aims art and technics 
serve (such as the human being, reason, or spirit) but, rather, how they respectively function 
in themselves. In what follows, I will try to find some logic to this confrontation. I will look 
for it in some technical contexts and some artworks.16 The point is not to discover the reasons 
behind art and technics, but to understand their functioning: not why they are but what they 
are and how. Such a dialogue did not take place in Hegel and hardly even in Heidegger, but it 
is very important today. 
 
Liberation of Technics 
Let us suppose, following Heidegger's suggestion, that the aim of the dialogue between art 
and technics is the liberation of both into their respective essences. Since Romanticism, art 
claims its freedom: art must be free of servitude or it is not art. When art is free, it can be the 
site of truth that philosophers from Schelling to Heidegger have always seen in it. Art can 
make use of techniques and reflect upon them, but it should not serve them or be limited by 
them. This, however, is a reflection on technics as an instrument of art, not as its subject: 
technics is just a detour in the way towards truth, not the aim or topic of art.  
Let us ask a rather unusual question: can one speak about freedom in technics and of 
liberation of technics? Heidegger called for a free relation to technics, meaning, firstly, the 
liberation of the human being from her subservience to technics to meditating upon the 
essence of technics. To some extent, this liberates technics as well: when technics is asked to 
reveal its essence, it is no longer asked to serve as a tool, but, on the contrary, to stop 
functioning (like the famous hammer in Being and Time).17 When Heidegger elaborates the 
question in an epochal context, he says that when modern technics is liberated from its 
function and allowed to reveal its essence, it discloses a totalitarian world of calculus and 
planning in which the human being and nature have been reduced to simple resources.18 This 
is a liberation for a truth, albeit an uncomfortable and devastating one. 
But, for Heidegger, the liberation of technics is always a liberation from technics 
towards another relation to truth. He is not interested in technical objects for their own sake. 
By contrast, this is precisely what interests Gilbert Simondon, who has recently become 
popular among art researchers.19 Simondon’s aim is rare in philosophy: the liberation of the 
technical object itself. He regrets that the technical objects are generally hidden behind human 
ends: they are most often examined simply in terms of a person’s aims (the hammer is the 
means for constructing a house), which are sometimes complex (the hammer is fabricated in 
order to be sold on the capitalist market) and sometimes even philosophical (the hammer must 
break down so that I can start to philosophize about the world). Simondon asks instead: what 
is the technical object’s own internal finality? What is its own individuation? What kind of an 
individual is it, what are its elements, and what are the assemblies to which it belongs? What 
is its associated milieu and evolution? Such questions “liberate” the object from its concrete 
and symbolic submission, especially from its subordination to economical ends, and in this 
way they “save” it. A free technical object is “open” in the sense that it allows interventions, 
calls for new inventions, and thus generates a truly technological thinking that is close to 
artistic imagination.20 Today, engineers who study the possibility of free and open 
technologies develop machines that can learn and even program themselves. 
Let me give you a familiar example. Following their technological evolution, our cell 
phones can contact all cell phones all over the world through sound, text, and image. This 
capacity is nonetheless hampered by operators who artificially make it difficult or even 
impossible to phone another country, by phone manufacturers who make phones such that 
they tend to break down after a year’s use and fill it with silly games that blur the primary aim 
of communicating, and so on. In the world of computers, such artificial limits and intentional 
obsolescence are even stronger. Our technical apparatuses perform just a little part of what 
they actually can do, not because of technological obstacles but because of artificial 
limitations that stem from commercial interests. This is why we have turned from resourceful 
weekend handymen into inept consumers whose gadgets are “black boxes” that we can no 
longer open, fix, modify, and tinker with by ourselves.21 This is the subjection that Simondon 
resists. His aim is not to liberate us from technics but to liberate technics itself to evolve in 
terms of its true possibilities. When technological objects are set free to evolve freely, also the 
human beings are liberated to become the complete technical individuals that they are capable 
of being. 
At the limit where the aim of technics is to become liberated in the activity of reflecting 
and realizing all of its possibilities, technology comes close to art. Both of them develop 
through reflecting on their own means. Musical evolution, for instance, has often been the 
result of composers’ reflection on the available instrumental technologies of their art (such as 
the harpsichord) and of the compositional techniques of their time (for example, the fugue). 
Sometimes it is impossible to distinguish artistic and technological evolution, as for instance 
when the evolution of a technological instrument (such as the replacement of the harpsichord 
by the Hammerklavier) leads to more intensive art (Couperin gives way to Liszt), until a 
saturation of the instrument’s possibilities brings about the question of the saturation of the 
entire art form (can you still compose for the piano today?). Sometimes the calm line of 
evolution is interrupted when a new and unexpected possibility emerges out of the blue and 
leads to different inventions (a keyboard linked to a computer is not a bad piano but a good 
sampler). Maybe the art-technical meditation on the essence of a given art or technique has 
reached the essence of the latter and overturned it; maybe an exterior contingent event has 
interfered in a line of evolution and given it a new direction. But is this the true liberation of 
art and technics or just their ordinary evolution? Isn’t a piano liberated in an artwork, as in 
Rebecca Horn’s Concert for Anarchy in which a grand piano is hung upside down so that one 
cannot play it? 
 
Artistic Confrontations with Modern Technology 
Contrary to those who, like Duhem, claim that Simondon’s thinking is a key to new 
aesthetics, I think that something quite different happens when art questions technics. While 
Simondon, Friedrich Kittler, Bernard Stiegler, and others mainly want to liberate the technical 
object to function as well as possible, artists who seize technical objects generally seek to 
make this functioning visible and problematic. For this purpose, they distort, interrupt, or 
otherwise modify something in the technical dispositif, and this is when a machine becomes a 
work of art. Art liberates technics from its function towards a questioning of this function. Out 
of an abundance of works, I will extract just three lines of development: description of 
machines, deconstruction of productive processes, and engineering of chimaeras. What strikes 
me most is the way in which each of them detaches technics from spiritual truth and relates it 
to a particular interpretation of nature instead. 
Description of machines. For a long time already, numerous artworks have staged 
technological objects in order to ask what constitutes their technicity. Among the most 
obvious examples, one can mention Jean Tinguely’s machines, such as Rotozaza. Tinguely 
studies the being-machine of machines by constructing pseudomachines that do not produce 
anything or serve any purpose other than their own joyful existence. Thanks to the rupture of 
external finality, internal finality can emerge; it appears in the machine’s functioning, the 
essence of which is the repetition of the same. Sometimes reminiscent of strange otherworldly 
creatures, Tinguely’s machines incarnate the Cartesian interpretation of the machine as an 
organized being that is capable of repetition, and this is also how he revives the Cartesian idea 
of nature as a repetitive mechanism that has no meaning of its own. A similar view is 
presented in the famous appendix of Gilles Deleuze’s and Félix Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, 
where most examples of machines in art are show machines, liberated from productivity to 
pure functioning.22 In these works, the fundamental characteristic of technics is repetition. 
This principle was widely studied in the 1960s (especially by Deleuze and Derrida), when 
repetitive techniques were valorized as a subversive antidote to a totalitarian logos. At the 
same time, albeit quite marginally, nature was sometimes presented as a repetitive non-logos, 
the prototype of which was the repetition compulsion of the human psyche. 
Deconstruction of productive processes. Machines, however, not only function, they 
generally also produce something. Hence, there are artworks that examine productive 
processes in terms of their more or less intended effects and consequences. As an example, I 
point to Anaïs Tondeur’s photos of leaves picked at Chernobyl (republished by her and 
Michael Marder in Chernobyl Herbarium). Tondeur’s photos incarnate, in a delicate manner, 
the devastating consequences of nuclear technologies, which must be counted among the 
technologies most symptomatic of our times. These photos do not study a technology as a 
repetitive process but, on the contrary, as an ambiguous agent of definite change. They 
examine nuclear technology as a productive process, and remind us that in material reality, 
every production is also a production of pollution and waste. Furthermore, no production is 
only the fabrication of a product, but is always also the adjustment of an entire associated 
milieu in such a way that each arrangement of a territory is also a devastation (of something in 
it). Directing attention towards a technology that changes natural beings and lifeworlds into 
resources and puts them in danger, Tondeur goes in a direction that Heidegger has signaled 
without ever going there himself. But she does something else as well, insofar as the milieu 
she reveals is not a historical place of a people but the natural milieu of different plants. What 
she studies is not a world in Heidegger’s sense but a biological environment. She interprets 
“nature” as living beings with their environments. Tondeur examines technological processes 
that would not exist if they were not parasitic upon natural processes, and shows how this 
parasitic character ends by modifying some other natural processes permanently. The leaves 
she photographs are definitely polluted and transformed by nuclear fallout.23 
Engineering chimaeras. Yet another gesture can be found in contemporary art when 
technical devices are not shown but are used in order to measure the limits of what they can 
do. An infamous example of this approach is, of course, Eduardo Kac’s GFP Bunny: a living 
rabbit, Alba, that glows green in the dark, because it has been created, at Kac’s demand, by 
INRA through the addition of genetic material from a jellyfish into a rabbit embryo. Who 
actually did what and why is not clear, but the point is that the artist did not actually do much 
more than want a chimaera, which was then produced in a laboratory by specialists, not by 
Kac himself, who lacks the equipment and the knowhow. In contrast to Tinguely and 
Tondeur, Kac does not use virtuoso artistic techniques in order to picture technological 
objects: on the contrary, his work is based on technological processes that the artist does not 
master, but which he lets function in order to see what emerges when an existing technology 
is set free to develop all its possibilities. In this case, new biotechnologies picture nature as a 
plastic, modifiable matter out of which chimaeras can be made. (Note, however, that rather 
than mastering a technique, Kac’s mastery consists in wanting its use: maybe he is a virtuoso 
consumer.)  
A much more likeable example is Tomás Saraceno’s Spider Session, which represents 
for us a complementary work to GFP Bunny. In Spider Session, Saraceno exposes techniques 
used by spiders in order to build their webs. His point is to show a technical exploit that 
neither he nor any other human being is capable of performing: the construction of a 
spiderweb, a perfect example of the tierische Kunsttrieb described by Schelling. What the 
artist can do is direct us to this natural technique by exposing the spiders in glass boxes. What 
we see is not the workings of an existing human technology but the functioning of an animal 
technology that it is impossible, or at least very difficult, for humans to imitate. It shows the 
plasticity of nature, not as an object modeled by our desires but as a subject that already 
models its environment in ways alien to us.24 Spiders have inspired many of Saraceno’s other 
works as well, such as On Space Time Foam, which is a part of his Cloud Cities series. Here 
he has been helped by professional mathematicians. Once again the artist shows how little he 
can do by himself and how his role is limited to wanting to use a given technique. 
Works such as these examine very complicated technologies by exposing what seems to 
be a natural object that cannot itself be found in nature, since it wouldn’t be visible without a 
technological dispositif (such as spiderweb architecture) or wouldn’t even exist without a 
technological intervention (Alba). They appear because of a technological process that an 
artist has set in motion but the result of which is not entirely controllable by them: indeed, in 
these cases, a techno-natural process is expected to surprise its inceptor. The gesture of 
abandon of the use of human senses and crafts, and of letting-go of a technological process to 
do whatever it can do, can also be found, for instance, in Christian Boltanski’s Les Archives 
du Cœur, which is an archive, now situated on the Japanese island of Teshima, of recordings 
of thousands of series of human heartbeats. This is a work that is finally made by the 
recording device and that cannot be “listened to” or “seen” in its totality by anybody, not even 
the artist himself. At this limit, we could almost say that the technological device itself is the 
artist. One can ask whether a machine like Philae, which has not been constructed as an 
artwork but nonetheless awakens a very similar emotion (at least in myself), is not finally 
very close to these works.25  
How does art liberate technology in works of this type? When are these processes “art” 
and not just capitalist consumption of new technological possibilities? Following both 
Heidegger and Walter Benjamin, in a situation very different than theirs, we could say: in the 
works that enframe and set forth a technological possibility, art happens when a world is set 
into a work in such a way that it brings about a shock. We are not in Kant’s or Heidegger’s 
world anymore: the shock is caused neither by the beauty of the works, nor because of their 
sublime greatness, nor by the signs of gods that give sense to a people’s historical dwelling 
(as in Heidegger’s interpretations of Hölderlin). Art surely happens when something in our 
thoughts is suspended, interrupted, like in the Kantian analytic of the sublime. But what is 
interrupted, then? At least six features appear. 
1) Work. Our expectations concerning the being of a work of art are interrupted, since 
the machine is a strange artwork that is not encountered most essentially through the senses 
but through the observation of its capacity for functioning and producing. Neither the craft of 
the artist nor the senses of the public matter much: we are invited to observe a techno-natural 
dispositif do whatever it can do. 
2) World. Our expectations of what the world is are interrupted, since the technological 
dispositif produces a difference in the world, if not an entirely different world. The 
technological works of art do not produce a world of sense that grounds the homeworld of a 
human community (as in Hegel’s or Heidegger’s examples of Great Art). Instead of a 
“world,” a technological dispositif can enframe its dissolution, or an altogether different 
environment or “associated milieu” that is rather characterized by nonsense (Tinguely), 
accidents (Tondeur), and the hazardous chance of chimerical productions.  
3) Techno-nature. But what “spirit” deems nonsensical can be entirely coherent from 
the point of view of nature. Of course, in these works, our expectations of what nature is are 
interrupted. They seem to mime nature without being “natural” at all (in the sense in which 
Kant, for instance, would have understood “natural”). Chernobyl leaves, the rabbit Alba, 
spiderweb constructions, and the heart archive’s heartbeats are, each in their own (very 
different) way, artificial natural beings, chimerical creatures. Certainly they are fabricated (by 
the artist, by their technical aids, by machines, by animals). But, at the same time, as soon as a 
living creature is fabricated, it becomes a genuine living being that lives its own life like any 
other living being. The technologically affected natural beings and fabricated chimeras live on 
and have their own individuation, open up their own associated milieu, and start their own 
evolutionary possibilities. 
The works that we have examined point out precisely that, for us, this artificiality 
belongs to nature. All types of techno-art were grafted upon a conception of nature: nature as 
a repetitive mechanism (Tinguely), as sensitive environment (Tondeur), or as modifiable and 
even creative processes (Saraceno and Kac). Not only does each technology relies on a certain 
force of nature but each one of them also produces a certain nature. Nature and technique 
cannot be opposed and differentiated anymore; one produces the other and there is only one 
singular techno-nature, the production of which—out of the différance between repetition and 
creation—is the ultimate question of techno-art. 
4) Surprise and contingency. Note that the use of techno-scientific means to reveal our 
general techno-natural condition does not mean reducing everything to calculable and 
planified processes (as in Heidegger’s explications of the technical age). On the contrary, in 
these works, our expectations of the ordinary course of technology and nature are surprised. 
We encounter a glowing rabbit, a spiderweb city, an image sent by a robot from a distant 
comet. What surprises us is not the order and the grandeur of nature, like in Kant, nor the 
coming of a god, like in Heidegger. It is an invention that may be set forth by human 
curiosity, but is fundamentally the discovery of something that human beings did not 
foresee—such as the discovery of tierische Kunsttrieb mentioned by Schelling. The human 
artistic gesture is made discreet and passive in order to welcome something unexpected, 
unplanned, and genuinely surprising: techno-nature’s own artistic gesture. When a 
technological process is set to work beyond the reach of the human hand, it is expected to 
produce something unexpected (the paradox is intentional). At least the artist hopes for the 
end of repetition, the happening of invention, and the emergence of novelty. The 
technological process itself is the place of the emergence of this new thing. The work gives 
place to a chance that the artist could not foresee. And what does the surprise show? Neither 
God nor reason nor pure nature—but rather the contingency of technological creations (such 
as a chimaera, a hazardous genetic code, or maybe a distant comet). 
This is the philosophical heart of the problematics touched by contemporary techno-art. 
Through technology, this art is obsessed by nature, because nature has changed much more 
than our current official representations of it admit. It is not orderly and regular, as with 
Newton’s mechanics as well as schoolbooks and political discourses: it has turned out to be 
changing, surprising, and unexpected, sometimes in terms of our doings, and sometimes quite 
on its own. The ontological fabric of our reality is the very opposite of classical ontotheology 
because it rests on a techno-nature that is in itself multiple, contingent, and surprising. 
5) Artist. Especially the works in which chimaeras are engineered, our expectations of 
the work of the artist are interrupted. As we have already seen, in these works, the artist seeks 
a passive attitude of letting-be and letting-happen. S/he quits the attitude of craft and making 
and mimes science and thinking instead. S/he hardly engages in activities like painting, 
constructing, making a lab synthesis, or caring for a living being, at least not as a virtuoso 
artist but at most as a simple lab assistant whose work is not distinguished by any exceptional 
skill. The artist simply performs the gesture of enframing a techno-natural process. This 
gesture of pointing out a process that is already virtually present in a natural situation 
provoked by a technological dispositif is the heart of the work. It indicates the problematic 
moment in which human intervention changes an impossible process into a quasinatural 
possibility. 
6) Political judgment. Finally, most techno-natural artworks examined here interrupt 
something in our ethical or political expectations and call for evaluation and judgment. 
Something that might seem natural (a leaf, a rabbit) is actually produced by a human agent; 
the decision to do this, a decision that can be neither justified nor forbidden, has actually been 
made. A baby rabbit is not simply born to its mother, it is made to glow in the dark with 
jellyfish colors. A spider does not simply weave a web but is imprisoned to do it. Are you 
shocked by the Chernobyl leaves and Alba the rabbit? In modern art, an artwork is not 
expected to moralize. Nonetheless, it can still bring us to the verge of the tragical that, ever 
since Aristotle, has marked the moment in which art produces an ethical or a political shock. 
In techno-natural works, the tragical effect rises, for the first time, not only from the human 
community but from the environing techno-nature. Was the fate of these leaves and rabbits 
fair? Did the inhabitants of Chernobyl deserve their fate? Ordinary scientific and political 
discourses do everything they can to avoid any emotions evoked by the promises and dangers 
of, say, fossil fuels, nuclear technologies, information technologies, and biotechnological 
manipulation. Where tragical emotions are absent, moral evidences are not reconsidered and 
political decisions are replaced by specialist recommendations. In such circumstances, art can 
be more than shock at the fact that this is: it can also be the moral shock that asks what should 
be and what should not.  
This, arguably, is how art ultimately liberates technology in “technological art.” It 
liberates it from the kind of moral idiocy that is often attributed to technologies when they are 
regarded as mere instruments. Art claims that it needs to be free to do anything feasible and 
that, because of the disinterestedness of beauty, no work of art should be evaluated morally. 
Science and technology reclaim the same freedom in the name of pure knowledge that as such 
is beyond good and evil (“it’s not the nuclear bomb that is evil, it’s the hand that launches it”). 
Techno-art, however, questions these claims by forcing us to ask whether everything can 
really be instrumentalized (if you can make Alba, why not a human baby with the respiratory 
system of a fish, in order to produce a mermaid?) and whether, rather than suspending 
judgment before art, we are not invited to make judgments here and now about these 
complicated cases that are ordinarily not judged by the general public. These are perhaps 
unusual and unwelcome questions in the visual arts, but literature is used to them. Think about 
Margaret Atwood’s Madd’addam trilogy or Svetlana Alexievich’s books on Chernobyl or the 
fall of the Soviet empire. Their aim is not to show a technology as neutral but, on the contrary, 
to show how the tragical is today embedded in the technological. 
 
How Does Technique Liberate Art? 
We have seen how art can liberate technology from its utility and instrumentality and expose 
it as such in its functioning. The work allows us to glimpse its associated milieu and the need 
to chart it; it is also a signpost from which one can try to measure the width and the depth of 
the world in which the technical device has first been found. The works we have studied no 
longer carry out Heidegger’s artistic program; instead of a “setting into work of truth,” the 
artwork becomes an invitation to examine and to evaluate its workings independently of their 
truthfulness. In order to complete the task of examining the dialogue between art and 
technology that we have nonetheless inherited from Heidegger, we should also ask whether 
technology, in turn, liberates art, and how. 
It is important to be careful with terms here. As we have seen, art has never been 
without techniques: technē (and Kunst) is, from the beginning, both art and technique. This 
identity concerns artistic techniques themselves: a painter’s materials, a musician’s 
instruments, or a writer’s words on the one hand; rules of composition, harmony, rhyme, 
measure, and other technical principles on the other. If certain philosophers such as Kant 
minimize the role of artistic techniques and maximize the role of natural talent of the genius, 
those with insight into actual artistic practice will often underline the necessity, for the artist, 
of mastering the techniques of one’s art and of then transcending and overcoming simple 
technicity towards the ideality of art within the framework of technical mastery. The 
liberation of an art within its technique generally consists in the transgression of a rule—such 
as painting a smiling Madonna or composing a diabolus in musica—that becomes a sparkle of 
freedom within a rule. As Peter Szendy has shown concerning music in his Membres 
fantômes: des corps musiciens, the transgression of technique presupposes an intimate 
connection between the musician’s body, sensibility, and thoughts, on the one hand, and the 
technical instruments and rules, on the other—the haunting of the one by the other.26 We may 
ask whether Hegelian philosophers are right in assuming that, in the end, technicality has to 
give way to the ideality and spirituality of Beauty?27 
It seems to me that the works of Jean-Luc Nancy provide a counterargument to this, as 
they remind us that art needs to touch and that this touching is also embodied and therefore 
technical (in the sense that bodies, according to Nancy’s Corpus, are “ecotechnical” objects—
which is not to say that they are “technological”).28 Can we be touched without some “body” 
that not just is but, directly or indirectly, exposes itself ecotechnically in dancing, singing, 
playing an instrument, speaking, writing, or painting? The contemplation of beauty in an 
artwork may move our reason, but this is perhaps possible only because its technical 
execution has the power of moving and touching our existence in the first place. I doubt that, 
however “conceptual” the work, the spectators’, listeners’, or readers’ experience of art could 
truly take place without the joy caused by some technical virtuosity. It would seem that in 
some works, the weakening of the sensible aspect of the work is accompanied by the 
emergence of its technical aspect that had been left in the shadow of the sensible surface. 
Even if it is sometimes difficult to see how a technological work of art “touches” us, this is 
perhaps because it has not exactly been given to the senses (eyes, ears…) but to something 
that can be called intelligence or capacity for observation (something that asks “how does it 
work?”). Should we think that these works touch us by their very technicity, and thus by 
something that is not a form but rather gives form?  
But this only concerns the artistic techniques that have always been both used (in order 
to do art) and reflected upon (in order to create more beauty). The artworks of the 
“technological turn” deal with technology in a different sense: they study technological 
objects and processes that, to start with, have nothing to do with art (or lose their art, like 
Rebecca Horn’s hanging piano). These works do not rise from art’s self-reflection but from 
the reflection of technological reality in art. Of course, sometimes this reflection is executed 
by means of traditional artistic techniques. Tinguely and Tondeur, for example, are still 
virtuosos in their respective techniques (sculpture and photography), and the reflection of 
technique as artistic subject takes place within the artist’s reflection of his or her own artistic 
technique (for instance, does not photographic film capture nuclear radiation as well?). By 
contrast, installations and happenings like those of Kac and Saraceno let technological 
processes function according to their own logic that has little or nothing to do with traditional 
artistic techniques. In order to install these works, the artists have given up their technical 
mastery, and they either work as amateurs or engage specialists to perform the technical work 
that the artist simply conceives. In contrast to traditional “fine art,” their art resembles the art 
of the set decorator that has rarely been very highly esteemed (with exceptions, such as the 
court of Louis XIV). In the contemporary context, however, the primary focus of their work is 
elsewhere. Paradoxically, it would seem that the more they penetrate into the essence of 
modern technics, the more they give up their own technical mastery. This discloses 
contemporary technics as a very particular type of technē: as a sophisticated technique that 
excludes human technical mastery, making the artist a definite dilettante or novice. In 
abandoning technique, art also abandons itself: rather than active artistic making, it seeks the 
passivity of conceiving and contemplating. From doing, art tends to turn into simple knowing; 
from looking and hearing, it tends to turn into mere thinking. Here, the relation between art 
and technique consists in this suspension, in the creation of a void between the two. In a way, 
the encounter of new technologies empties art of its own techniques and makes it “stupid,” 
“ignorant,” or “amateur,” in the sense that it uses, without specialist knowhow, means other 
than its own proper techniques.   
In these cases, being in a free relation to a technique does not mean using it as freely as 
possible as an instrument, but, on the contrary, leaving it to its own being, becoming receptive 
towards it, and letting oneself be used by it. Heidegger’s word “releasement” (Gelassenheit) 
could well describe this attitude, were it not directed primarily against modern technology, 
and not towards it.29 The “releasement” towards technology that we find in contemporary art 
sometimes resembles the primitive phenomena of possession, in which the human being 
abandons herself to an alien force (for instance, the force of an artistic technique), and yet it is 
something else; here, one gives oneself over to a technical dispositif as its material knowingly 
and willingly. This is particularly evident in works like Boltanski’s Archives du cœur, but the 
same mechanism can also be seen in any work in which the artist steps back from a technical 
dispositif in order to let it develop all its possibilities freely. The difficulty, here, consists in 
letting oneself be used while at the same time remaining capable of judging this use. 
This change of means brings about a certain emptiness. Art makes use of untraditional 
means that cannot be mastered with virtuosity, techniques and technologies that are strange, 
enigmatic, and incomprehensible for it. By using them “badly” it reveals the emptiness of the 
techniques in question, the void ignored by the techniques themselves. Accordingly, the 
artistic gesture lets technique/technology see the emptiness and strangeness of its own means 
(after all, what on earth exactly am I doing here?). In this dialogue, both participants are faced 
with their own void because of the question posed by the other, a question that does not 
follow expected rules: it would be strange to ask whether a technology is beautiful, and it is 
also strange to ask whether an artistic process functions well. This is how the dialogue 
discloses the lack of foundation in both. 
Does this kind of art reveal the artist as the inept consumer of technological gadgets that 
saddened Simondon? Or does it, on the contrary, open up a new dialogue between the artist 
and the engineer, a dialogue in which both are faced with their own incompetence through the 
other’s deficient understanding (why do you do that? and how?) and both nonetheless insist 
that they share a common technological reality. Art liberates technique from technique, since 
its works are neither useful nor sensible. Technique liberates art from art—it makes art, so to 
speak, lose its means. The gesture between the two remains visible, intelligible: it is an 
interrogative gesture precisely because it is mute, stunned, and ignorant. 
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Notes 
1 Heidegger, “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes,” in Gesamtausgabe, vol. 5, 45–46 (hereafter, 
GA 5)/”The Origin of the Work of Art,” trans. A Hofstadter, in Basic Writings, 182 
(hereafter, OWA). 
2 Heidegger, “Die Frage nach der Technik,” in Vorträge und Aufsätze, 9, 16, 23/“The 
Question Concerning Technology,” trans. W. Lovitt, in Basic Writings, 311, 318, 324. 
3 Haunting is a mode of phenomenality without phenomenon, or of presence without a present 
thing, that Jacques Derrida introduced as a phenomenological problem in Specters of Marx. 
An example of haunting is the ghost of Hamlet’s father’s, whose presence was effective (it 
made Hamlet do many things), even though a ghost is, of course, not “really” present. By 
extension, haunting became a general name for all kinds of invisible influences. Here, art is 
“haunted” by technique when it is obsessed by it rather than consciously reflecting upon of its 
role.  
4 The work of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe work is an indispensable background for any work 
on this mimetic rivalry, as well as on the logic of mimetic rivalry in general. See Lacoue-
Labarthe, The Subject of Philosophy and L’imitation des modernes. 
5 Lindberg, Le monde défait. 
6 I take the term from Ludovic Duhem, according to whom the technological turn in art begins 
in the 1980s. For a detailed presentation of the place given to technique in philosophy of art, I 
refer to Duhem, “Introduction à la techno-esthétique” and “Vers une techno-esthétique.” 
7 Particularly in the last part of his System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), Schelling 
affirms that art is “the only true and eternal organ and document of philosophy.” F. W. J. 
Schelling, Sämmtliche Werke, vol 1.3, 627/System of Transcendental Idealism, 231. 
8 GA 5, 48/OWA, 186.  
9 Heidegger, “Was heisst Denken?”, in Vorträge und Aufsätze, 127/”What Calls for 
Thinking?”, trans. D.F. Krell, in Basic Writings, 373. 
10 Heidegger, “Überwindung der Metaphysik”, in Vorträge und Aufsätze, 88–89/ 
“Overcoming Metaphysics,” trans. J. Stambaugh, in The End of Philosophy, 107. 
11 Heidegger, “Die Frage nach der Technik,” in Vorträge und Aufsätze, 28/“The Question 
Concerning Technology,” trans. W. Lovitt, in Basic Writings, 330. 
12 Heidegger, “Die Frage nach der Technik,” in Vorträge und Aufsätze, 39–40/“The Question 
Concerning Technology,” in Basic Writings, 340–41. 
13 Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft/Critique of the Power of Judgment, § 15. 
 
                                            
                                                                                                                                          
14 Schelling, Sämmtliche Werke, vol. 1.7, 455. 
15 Lacoue-Labarthe, Musica ficta. 
16 The examples below have been chosen almost at random. There are many works in which 
art stages technology—from the Gothic novels of E. T. A. Hoffman and Mary Shelley through 
futurist paintings to contemporary technological and biotechnological art. On the other hand, 
modern technologies use more and more artistic means, sometimes simply by downplaying art 
into design (media and communication technologies), but sometimes also by exploring the 
artistic dimensions of a technological device (for instance, the ongoing debates on whether 
computer games can be art). 
17 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 63–110/Being and Time, 63–107. 
18 See, e.g., Heidegger, “Das Ge-stell”, in Gesamtausgabe, vol. 79, 24–45/ “Positionality,” in 
Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, 23–43. 
19 Simondon, Du mode d'existence des objets techniques. 
20 A scientific example of such free technological thinking could be the accidental discovery 
of X-rays while investigating cathode rays with Crookes tubes.  
21 The same phenomenon is described by Friedrich Kittler when he shows how, in the 1920s, 
radio become a public service only after radio technology had been diluted from its original 
sending-receiving capacity to a receive-only-device. See Kittler, The Truth of the 
Technological World. 
22 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Œdipus, 463–87. 
23 See also: Tuula Närhinen, Baltic Sea Plastique: 
http://www.tuulanarhinen.net/artworks/baltplast.html 
24 In the dialogue with Toni Hildebrandt, “World-Making Models,” 171, Eduardo Kac 
explains Alba as follows: “As a bioartist, I do not make objects, I make subjects, and a subject 
is biologically living, not a metaphor.” But precisely: insofar as Alba is “made,” it is also an 
object, and its subjectivity is like the subjectivity of all chimaeras marked by the desire of 
another subject that has wanted it to be different from all other rabbits of the world.   
25 Philae is a robotic European Space Agency lander brought by the spacecraft Rosetta to 
Comet 67B Churymov-Gerasimenko, located some 500 million kilometers from Earth. For a 
while, Philae sent images back to Earth, then fell into a “hibernation” because of empty 
batteries, “woke up” a couple of times when its solar panels were charged, and is now no 
longer able to communicate. Think about the tiny robot, left alone on a barren stone in the 
midst of darkest infinity in order to “see” infinity for us, while we cannot see it seeing 
anymore… would you call Philae useful—or sublime? 
 
                                                                                                                                          
26 Peter Szendy, Membres fantômes – Des corps musiciens. 
27 Like Adorno who thought that the best way of appreciating music is reading its score 
silently. This may have been a “virtue out of necessity.” 
28 Nancy, Corpus, 89. 
29 Heidegger, “Gelassenheit,” in Gesamtausgabe, vol. 16, 527–28/Discourse on Thinking, 54–
55. 
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